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Abstract 
The article analyzes the role of tariff setting for the Public-Private Partnership projects showing investment attractiveness of the project 
and it’s financing. For this reason, we determine the main sources of project income as revenue guarantee for private investors, analyze 
international experience of tariff regulation of infrastructure projects and determine its advantages and disadvantages. Also the main cri-
teria for setting tariffs of PPP projects are defined and proposed the way to improve tariff regulation in accordance with partner’s interests 
and applicable law.
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Introduction
There is quite an urgent issue of comprehensive mod-
ernization of public infrastructure for the CIS countries at 
the present stage of its development. Budget funds oppor-
tunities to finance major infrastructure projects are very 
limited. Moreover, the main features of most infrastructure 
projects are immensity, capital intensity and long duration 
that are complicated by the process of project funding and 
external financial needs. Furthermore, potential investors’ 
politics have become more balanced and sensitive to the 
conditions of investment funds and their returns because 
of dealing with the financial crisis consequences. Accord-
ingly, the essential task is to create favorable conditions for 
investment to large-scale projects.
It should be noted that the size of the required in-
vestment for infrastructure development in Europe over 
the next 25 years is more than 4 trn euro or 350-450 bn 
euro annually (ULI Europe’s Urban Investment Network, 
2011). For example, in Europe approximately 9.1 bn euros 
per year was spent only on energy projects between 2005 
and 2009 (5.8 bn euro for electricity and 3.3 bn euro for 
the extraction and transportation of natural gas). However, 
the need for investment in this sector will increase to 14 
bn euro per year till 2020 (European Commission, 2011, 
p. 5). Clearly, the amount of required investment for infra-
structure development will significantly increase in the fu-
ture, and to meet the demand, there is a need to find effec-
tive modern financial mechanisms and available sources 
of financing. Thus, the OECD team estimated the average 
required investment for infrastructure development of its 
countries during the period of 2000/2005 - 2025/2030, the 
sum is enormous - 4,8 US $ trn  (Figure 1). And we should 
understand that infrastructure condition in OECD coun-
tries is much better than in CIS countries, i.e.  Investment 
needs are absolutely different.
Figure 1: Average required investment for infrastructure development of 
OECD countries during the period of 2000/2005 - 2025/2030, US $ bn 
Source: (OECD, 2006, p. 167; 195; 199; 314)
Discussion 
Thus, the ability to attract sufficient funding for any 
project depends on the certainty and the creditworthi-
ness of its sources of return. The nature of public-private 
partnership is a tool to attract investment for large-scale 
projects, the return of which depends on future cash flows 
of the project, i.e.  future income from the services provi-
sion. Accordingly, there are two sources of revenue: public 
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instruments (taxes) and income from the operation of the 
object (tariffs). Thus, the basic mechanisms of the future 
income from the object operation are (Yescombe, 2007, pp. 
232; 235-236) (Iossa, 2007, pp. 22-24) (OECD, 2006, pp. 
262-263):
- availability payment, i.e. established by the PPP 
agreement refers to amount and frequency of payments 
from the government to the private partner for the usage of 
public facility by customers. The estimation of payments 
amount is based on the total capital and operating costs of 
the private partner over the agreement period;
- “shadow tolls” are viewed as payments from a public 
entity to a contractor through the covering services provi-
sion cost based on the volume of the actual number of con-
sumers (in the case of government’s avoidance of payment 
for the population). This mechanism stimulates the object 
operator to provide quality services as the number of con-
sumers directly depends on the quality of work;
- direct consumer payment for services or goods which 
is established on condition of user’s willingness to pay for 
the consumption of public goods (roads, bridges, railways, 
utilities);
- guarantee of minimum return provided by the gov-
ernment to the operator, which secures a minimum level of 
income in the case of reducing the number of consumers 
from the target volume (existing risk demand). A payment 
under the guarantee available only if the minimum income 
of private operator in a certain period of time is less than 
it’s established in the PPP agreement.
However, if the payment for services or products is 
a major component of the funding source, the price sets 
for services must be prudent and economically justified. 
Thus, the establishment of adequate payment for the us-
age of commodities or services is an equation with three 
components: the price that consumers are willing to pay (if 
any are willing to pay, in case of transport infrastructure), 
the costs that the government is willing to accept, (if any 
are willing to accept) and investment rate of return for the 
concessionaire. The last one has a significant influence on 
the tariff setting because private partner can be stimulated 
to invest in the project only by return on invested capital.
Accordingly, it is necessary to create favorable condi-
tions for potential investors in order to finance the large-
scale projects, i.e. to introduce new models of tariff set-
ting. Thus, in international practice, exists method of 
tariff calculating based on rate of return on invested capital 
(Regulatory Asset Base - RAB) - a long-term tariff setting 
system, whose main objective is to encourage investment 
in the expansion and modernization of infrastructure, usu-
ally utilities sector. The basic principle of RAB-regulation 
is that capital invested in natural monopoly, should bring 
a minimum return required to attract new investment and 
development company, as well as to meet the level of in-
vestment risk.
First, the tariff setting method based on regulatory 
asset base has been applied in the UK in the late 1980’s 
during the process of privatization of the electric grid com-
plex and electricity market liberalization. In the mid-1990s 
Canada, USA, Australia and many countries of the West-
ern Europe are passed to the RAB, however, each country 
sets its own characteristics. In 2002, the European Union 
ordered the countries of Eastern Europe to apply RAB-
regulation in tariff setting for monopolies. Also in 2011 the 
transfer to RAB was completed in all Russian electricity 
distribution companies. RAB-regulation proved to be very 
effective: the power companies lowered their costs several 
times, as a result, rates of tariffs have fallen and invest-
ments in the sector have been increased (Гатагова, 2011, 
p. 1) (Губанов, 2010).
According to RAB-method tariff setting for the ser-
vice or product, it is based on calculating of the revenue 
requirements which is defined as the maximum allowable 
income that can get a company and is determined for some 
pre-regulatory period as the amount of invested capital 
(CAPEX), funds paid for a given rate of return and operat-
ing expenditures (OPEX).
Figure 2: Scheme of the revenue requirements calculating
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Revenue Requirements = OPEX + Depreciation+ 
(RAB x WACC),  
OPEX – operating expenditures of the company,
Depreciation – technical depreciation,
RAB – regulatory asset base,
WACC – weighted average of the cost of debt and eq-
uity financing (rate of return).
The most displaying experience in terms of attract-
ing investment through the transition to RAB is Romanian 
reform. In 2004, Romania has attracted to the distribu-
tion networks (electric and gas) regulation reform Italian 
company “Enel” and the investment bank “Credit Suisse”. 
Reform was carried out over several years, during its im-
plementation hundreds of millions of dollars investments 
were attracted. And in 2006, at a joint conference of regu-
lators from the European Union, Eastern Europe and the 
CIS the Romanian experience was recognized as the most 
successful. 
Crucially, the RAB model provides a guarantee to in-
vestors that they will earn a return not only on new CAPEX 
and OPEX, but also their sunk investments in the network. 
This guarantee typically takes the form of statutory legis-
lation which places a duty on the independent regulatory 
body to ensure that it sets the company’s allowed revenues 
such as that the company can finance its regulatory func-
tions (so long as it  runs efficiently). Although it has never 
been formally tested, companies can have recourse to the 
courts in the event that the regulator does not meet its duty. 
It has thus been seen ‘as a particularly credible and robust 
long-term contract ultimately guaranteed by law’ (Meaney 
A., 2012, p. 34). This feature means that the RAB model 
has the potential to solve the underinvestment problem in 
infrastructure investment largely resulting from the time-
inconsistency problem .
Accordingly, regulators calculates the tariff for ser-
vices or products with consideration the necessary gross 
proceeds. Tariff at RAB-regulation is set for a long period 
of 3-5 years, allowing the company to save and reduce 
their operating costs within 1-3 years of current rates. In-
come received by tariffs aimed at servicing debt and used 
to attract additional funds (loan) to upgrade equipment and 
develop the company.
The regulatory asset base comprises the assets used to 
provide the regulated services. Typically regulators apply 
the following principles for RAB:
- It includes only assets necessary to provide regu-
lated services;
- It is based on the residual (depreciated) value of 
fixed assets:
- It may include allowance for net working capital;
- It excludes any capital contributions (external 
funding, subsidies) from customers, government or third 
parties.
World practice shows that tariff regulation in the pow-
er supply sector based on RAB methodology has several 
advantages for power supply companies and consumers to 
the existing system “cost-plus” (Table 1).
92
Iana OVSIANNYKOVA
Journal of Social Sciences, 1(2):89-94,2012 ISSN:2233-3878
Table 1: Comparison of tariff regulation methods Sources: (Гатагова, 2011, p. 3) (Губанов, 2010) (Meaney A., 2012, pp. 
35-37)
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However, the RAB model has several issues which 
mean that it does not always represent a superior option 
over PPPs (Meaney A., 2012, pp. 3-4) (Губанов, 2010):
- Difficulties in providing an accurate initial RAB 
valuation;
- Funding—the RAB model doesn’t necessarily re-
solve the question of who ultimately pays for investments;
- Public procurement—for green-field projects, the 
RAB model still requires a method of public procurement;
- Bias towards higher gearing—as in the PPP mod-
el, there may be a tendency for assets to be financed with 
high levels of gearing. This may be considered a concern 
from a public policy perspective if it results in risk of de-
fault that might lead to users being asked to pay more for 
using the asset;
- CAPEX bias resulting from the fact that CAPEX 
is added to the RAB and earns a rate of return over time, 
whereas OPEX is remunerated on a pay-as-you-go basis.
Thus, the calculation and prediction tariff plan for the 
entire period of the object operation in the development of 
the feasibility study of the project is an important condition 
for the success of its implementation. This would help to 
estimate the size of investments, their payback period quite 
easily and to determine future tariff revenues as a major 
factor of investment risks. Accordingly, the tariff plan of 
the project must be submitted in the competition by all bid-
ders and the weighted average tariff for the period of the 
facility operation will act as significant economic criteria 
of potential partner selection.
The calculation of the weighted average tariff could 
be done according the next formula (Сиваев С.Б., 2012, 
p. 162):
T – the weighted average tariff;
t0 – the initial rate of the tariff for a period of signing 
the contract;
ki – the tariff change in the i- year, expressed as a frac-
tion of the tariff of the previous period;
n – number of tariff regulation periods.
It should be emphasized that the tenders for PPP con-
tracts in the municipal sector forms the special situation 
of competition for monopoly markets. But competition in 
the economy cannot be without a competitive price. Thus, 
in the contests of PPP, contracts in the municipal sector 
should be moved from regulated tariffs by authorities to 
unregulated competitive tariffs (can be also competitive 
but regulated in some bands). Moreover, these tariffs may 
be a criterion in terms of competition and according to 
competition rules cannot be above the level specified in 
the tender documentation (Сиваев С.Б., 2012, p. 161). In 
addition, it is necessary to consider the annual rate of infla-
tion in tariff setting, i.e. tariff brings in real prices each year 
depending on changes of the inflation level.
It could be shown on the example of the project of 
natural gas production and its supply to industrial custom-
ers. We calculate and predict the tariff plan at the start of 
the project operation according to three scenarios: scenario 
№ 1 reflects the rate of 2012, scenario № 2 assumes the 
annual increase prices by 7% during all period of the pro-
ject operation and scenario № 3 shows the annual increase 
prices by 10% during the first 10 years of the project opera-
tion (Fig. 3).
Figure 3: Forecast of the project tariff plan, UAH
Thus, every application for PPP should have the feasi-
bility study that indicates the predicted tariff for the period 
of the project operation and, if the weighted average tariff 
is lower than offered by other bidders, then this participant 
has a significant advantage of others.
However, when the income of  private partner  in the 
PPP projects is derived from customers’ payment, the cur-
rent issue is the criteria for setting tariffs, which must also 
be taken into account. In our opinion, rate of tariff must 
meet three basic criteria (Iossa, 2007, pp. 19-20) (Meaney 
A., 2012, pp. 39-40) (Akintoye A., 2009, pp. 206-207):
- Allocative efficiency calls for a pricing rule that 
sets tariffs as close as possible to social marginal costs, 
including not only the private production costs facing the 
private-sector party but also any cost or benefit imposed on 
other activities;
- Distributional considerations, i.e. the public sec-
tor may prefer pricing the service below marginal costs. 
Further, differentiated tariffs can be set according to types 
of services, categories of consumers, etc. to reflect differ-
ent marginal costs. Also differentiated tariffs can help to 
implement a system of cross-subsidies taking distributional 
considerations into account (where some groups pay tariffs 
below costs and others pay tariffs above costs to compen-
sate);
- Bankability of the project, i.e. the tariff level 
should be such that the revenues collected by the private-
sector party are sufficient to cover operation and invest-
ments costs, whilst allowing a commercial rate of return. 
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In cases where the private-sector party makes large capi-
tal investments, the marginal-cost pricing will not allow 
bankability and user charges may have to be increased. 
However, the option to raise user charges levels should be 
compared with other means of ensuring bankability, such 
as using revenue subventions, increasing contract duration, 
or lowering the cost of capital through debt guarantees.
 Furthermore, tariff setting should also cope with other 
factors such as collection risk, i.e. the risk that users of the 
service try to avoid paying the user charge. A low collec-
tion risk is necessary for an efficient use of user charges.
Conclusion and Propositions
Thus, the research of payment mechanisms of public-
private partnership and features of its setting shows the 
success of involvement sufficient financial resources for 
the implementation of the project depends on the establish-
ment of a balanced tariff, from which the project company 
will be able to receive payments for its services in suffi-
cient volume to cover all operating costs, payments on debt 
obligations and the related earnings per equity.
So far, according to experts, the RAB-method is one 
of the most promising mechanisms for attracting private 
investment in the projects of public-private partnership, es-
pecially in utilities sector. It creates additional repayment 
guarantees of borrowed funds through tariffs and increases 
the attractiveness of the industry investment. Of course, the 
introduction of RAB-regulation will lead to higher growth 
rates for services at one time with the reduction of operat-
ing expenditures approximately on 20%. However, in the 
long term, due to increased efficiency of utilities facilities, 
lower costs, reduced losses and improved quality of ser-
vices, it is expected the decline of growth tariff rates. This 
together with the involvement of large-scale private invest-
ment in the sector, upgrading fixed assets of facilities will 
have a beneficial impact on the economy development.
Howewer, the implementation of this method requires 
significant changes in existing law, which takes long time. 
That’s why we recommend to use a mechanism for the es-
tablishment of “computed tariff” in the tender documenta-
tion and in the subsequent contractual relationships as a 
criterion of the competition. The concept of “computed 
tariff” provides that participants will show an annual tariff 
index increase, which will allow to achieve the technical 
and economic performance and upgrade municipal infra-
structure. Thus, the tariffs of utilities sector are regulated in 
accordance with the applicable laws despite the introduc-
tion of the “computed tariff” concept. In case of a differ-
ence between “computed tariff” and the real price it should 
be applied to the relevant provisions of the PPP contract 
governing the consequences of this situation. If there is 
a situation in which, the “computed tariff” will be higher 
than the seted rate in accordance with the applicable laws, 
the parties may agree that the budget will compensate the 
missing difference to the operator, or other parties’ actions 
according to the contract (agreement).
1 Government intervention following private sector provision of infra-
structure leads to an inherent problem, namely the time-inconsistency 
problem. This describes the potential for the government to initially pro-
vide a guarantee to investors ensuring recovery of costs associated with 
the investment, only to renege later on to expropriate rent from the private 
sector (Meaney A., 2012, p. 12)
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